A Content Analysis on the Phases of Emergency Management for Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico by Rivera, Jose
The Pegasus Review: UCF 
Undergraduate Research Journal 
(URJ) 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 2 
2020 
A Content Analysis on the Phases of Emergency Management for 
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico 
Jose Rivera 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Undergraduate Research at STARS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ) by an authorized editor of 
STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Rivera, Jose (2020) "A Content Analysis on the Phases of Emergency Management for Hurricane Maria in 
Puerto Rico," The Pegasus Review: UCF Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ): Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol11/iss1/2 
THE PEGASUS REVIEW:
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL
1www.URJ.ucf.edu
Vol. 11.1: 1-7
Published
May 30, 2019
A Content Analysis on the Phases of Emergency 
Management for Hurricane Maria in Puerto 
Rico
By: Jose Rivera
Faculty Mentor: Dr. Fernando Rivera
UCF Department of Sociology
ABSTRACT: The destruction caused by Hurricane Maria challenged the emergency management agencies in Puerto 
Rico. More than a month after the storm, most of the island remained without electricity, and full recovery has taken 
several months, if not years. This study explores the four phases of emergency management (mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery) for Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico from the perspective of FEMA and AEMEAD. Data 
comes from a content analysis of official communications, news reports, and social media postings from FEMA, 
AEMEAD, and other agencies responsible for emergency management in Puerto Rico. Results suggest that the 
magnitude of the storm, previous financial struggles, and a lack of preparedness were the main factors that influenced 
the emergency management process for AEMEAD. Also, results indicate that ongoing disasters, lack of priority, and 
geographic challenges were the main factors that influenced the emergency management process for FEMA. The 
findings of this study provide a comprehensive review of the emergency management procedures taken by FEMA and 
AEMEAD before, during, and after Hurricane Maria. This review can inform those involved in emergency management 
and can be utilized as a policy tool to learn and prepare for future catastrophic events.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2017, Puerto Rico was hit by a 
category 4 hurricane named Maria.1  It was the worst 
natural disaster in the island’s modern history, and the 
third most destructive hurricane in the United States. 
2 Hurricane Maria’s devastation was estimated to cost 
about $90 billion. This hurricane was the second largest 
and the deadliest of the season, causing about 2,975 
deaths in Puerto Rico.3  Hurricane Maria destroyed the 
entire northeastern part of the Caribbean, especially 
those areas previously affected by Hurricane Irma.
 Puerto Rico was completely devastated by the impact 
of Hurricane Maria. The socio-economic challenges of 
the island made the situation more complicated. Puerto 
Rico’s severe government insolvency complicated the 
emergency management process. Federal and Puerto 
Rican  authorities worked together to address the 
catastrophe in the island: The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Puerto Rico 
Emergency Management Administration (AEMEAD, 
for its Spanish acronym).
The 2017 hurricane season was particularly alarming 
since there were several hurricanes affecting the United 
States at the same time. First, the unexpected devastating 
impact of Hurricane Harvey in Houston, Texas. Then, 
the impact of Hurricane Irma in Florida and the 
Southeast of the U.S. Both of these emergencies deviated 
resources and the attention of federal agencies from the 
later impact of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. Funding 
and emergency response resources were already allocated 
to these affected states, leaving the devastated territory of 
Puerto Rico in a precarious situation.
Before Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico had been affected 
by Hurricane Irma. Although Irma did not cross through 
Puerto Rico as expected, she made the island more 
vulnerable. The island’s crumbling infrastructure was 
damaged, especially the Puerto Rico Electric and Power 
Authority (PREPA). Many households were left without 
water or electricity during the impact of Hurricane Irma. 
Approximately 60,000–80,000 of PREPA customers 
were without power.  Most of these customers did not 
have power restored before the impact of Hurricane 
Maria.
This study explores the four phases of emergency 
management, which include mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery for Hurricane Maria in 
Puerto Rico. The evaluation of these four phases 
provides a comprehensive review of the different 
emergency management procedures taken by FEMA 
and AEMEAD. Conflicting perspectives about the 
emergency management In particular, this study aspires 
to reach confident conclusions that clarify the role and 
actions taken by participating emergency management 
agencies throughout the catastrophe.
METHODOLOGY
Data utilized in this study comes from a content analysis 
of official communications, news reports, and social 
media postings related to FEMA, AEMEAD, and 
Hurricane Maria. Sources include the following: FEMA 
and AEMEAD’s website, El Nuevo Dia newspaper 
reports, as well as scholarly publications from CUNY 
and GWU, among others. This assessment evaluates 
the four phases of emergency management: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery for both agencies.
• Mitigation—The capabilities necessary to reduce 
the loss of life and property by lessening the impact 
of disasters.5 
• Preparedness—The capabilities required across 
the whole community to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats 
and hazards that pose the greatest risk.6
• Response—The capabilities necessary to save lives, 
protect property and the environment, and meet 
basic human needs after an incident has occurred.7 
• Recovery—The core capabilities necessary to assist 
communities affected by an incident to recover 
effectively. 8
An overview of AEMEAD’s role in the catastrophe 
was completed using its website as the main source. A 
holistic evaluation was done of AEMEAD’s website 
and its content to understand how much information 
about Hurricane Maria was provided. Then, official 
communications, Puerto Rican news reports, and 
executive statements were utilized as sources to analyze 
the phases of emergency management for AEMEAD. 
First, key themes that relate AEMEAD and Hurricane 
Maria were identified, such as AEMEAD’s Catastrophic 
Plan, island wide power outages, communication loss, 
etc. Then, these key themes were further researched.
As for FEMA, I performed a comprehensive comparison 
of the funding distribution across hurricanes Harvey in 
Texas, Irma in Puerto Rico, Irma in Florida, and Maria 
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in Puerto Rico. This evaluation was done using the 
disaster declaration reports available in FEMA’s website. 
The factors addressed in the comparison were Individual 
Assistance applications approved, total Individual 
& Households Program dollars approved, and total 
Public Assistance Grants dollars allocated to all four 
disaster declarations. Also, an evaluation of the phases 
of emergency management for FEMA was completed 
using the 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action 
Report as a primary source.
OBSERVATIONS
Puerto Rico Emergency Management Administration 
(AEMEAD)
The Puerto Rican (P.R.) government did not properly 
follow its Catastrophic Hurricane Plan with Hurricane 
Maria.9 This plan is made up of other sub-plans that 
address the emergency protocols to follow before, 
during, and after a hurricane. These sub-plans are as 
follows: The Operational Emergency Management Plan, 
Continuity of Operations Plan, Family Reunification 
Plan, Distribution Plan, and Mitigation Plan. All these 
plans are based upon a set of uniform procedures for 
emergency management established by the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), which is 
authorized by presidential orders. The most recent 
Operational Emergency Plan of the AEMEAD was 
approved on September 26, 2016 and the Mitigation 
Plan on August 3, 2016.10 Before Maria’s impact, 
approval of the Distribution Plan was still pending along 
with the evaluation of facilities that would be used as 
distribution centers. 
There had been limited simulations to test the 
effectiveness of the emergency plans with responders 
or the coordination of agencies with municipalities and 
the federal government before the catastrophe.11 Even 
though AEMEAD is responsible for requiring agencies 
and municipalities to have updated emergency plans, it 
did not fully comply with its own protocol. According 
to the 2016 Transition Report of the past administration 
of AEMEAD, only 24 of the 78 municipalities had 
an Operational Emergency Plan approved. Before 
Hurricane Maria, the only meeting between the 
interagency coordinators who were assigned to work in 
the Emergency Operations Center (COE, in Spanish) 
during the emergency occurred in March of 2017. 
According to Carlos Muñoz, an emergency responder 
with 45 years of experience working for AEMEAD, 
the agency as of June 2017 had only shared with the 
78 municipalities information about the company hired 
to develop the operational emergency plans for all 
municipalities.12 The agency was not prepared to respond 
to an emergency management situation.
Phases of Emergency Management
Mitigation
The P.R. government was not able to successfully follow 
its Mitigation Plan. This plan is federally required for 
every state and territory by the Stafford Act, which 
provides the guidelines for states and territories to 
develop their mitigation plans.13 AEMEAD, which is 
responsible for implementing the Mitigation Plan in 
the island, took limited mitigation measures. This agency 
does not publicly share its emergency plans as other 
states do, such as Florida.1415 Nevertheless, given the 
devastation of the hurricane, it is fair to conclude that 
mitigation procedures were not properly followed to 
prevent such a catastrophe.
The collapse of the infrastructure in Puerto Rico 
demonstrates the lack of implemented mitigation 
measures. The infrastructure was already in a very 
vulnerable condition before Hurricane Maria hit the 
island. Partially due to its financial struggles, Puerto 
Rico had not invested in renovating its infrastructure. 
Although maintaining a stable infrastructure is an 
essential component in the mitigation process, it was not 
given priority. All major power plants in Puerto Rico, 
which failed during and after the hurricane, date back to 
the 50’s and 70’s.16  Since then these major power plants, 
owned by PREPA, have not been heavily renovated. 
Infrastructure maintenance is a key element of the 
mitigation process, so the lack of priority from the P.R. 
government in ensuring a stable power grid demonstrates 
its ineffectiveness in following its mitigation plan.
Preparedness
The P.R. government did not prepare to face Hurricane 
Maria adequately. It had a sense of comfort and lack 
of urgency given that Hurricane Irma did not affect 
the island as expected. Originally, when Puerto Rico 
was given a hurricane advisory for Hurricane Irma, the 
expectations were that it was going to strike the island 
straight through the middle as a major hurricane. The 
P.R. government took needed actions to properly prepare 
for Hurricane Irma. By contrast, the general expectations 
11.1: 1-7
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of the P.R. government when preparing for Hurricane 
Maria underestimated the severity of the hurricane. 
The sense of urgency for Hurricane Maria was much 
less than for Irma since people on the island felt greater 
confidence on their level of preparedness and security. 
Island residents and the P.R. government had already 
prepared and mobilized to face Hurricane Irma, so 
people thought they were prepared to face Hurricane 
Maria.
The P.R. government did not prepare to face a hurricane 
with the magnitude of Hurricane Maria. The fast 
development of Hurricane Maria into a major category 
4 hurricane was overlooked in the preparation process. 
People in the island could not imagine that a hurricane 
like Maria could cause the amount of damage it did. 
The hurricane advisories given to Puerto Rico predicted 
that Hurricane Maria was going to impact the island as 
a major hurricane and that it was going to affect some 
areas severely, but many individuals were indifferent 
about these predictions. The P.R. government did 
not fully follow its Catastrophic Plan, including its 
communication methods.17  In particular, they relied 
on AEMEAD’s satellite communications system that 
broke down during the hurricane, leaving no alternate 
communication method.
Response
AEMEAD was incapable of effectively responding to the 
catastrophe since it did not fully follow its Emergency 
Operational Plan and Catastrophic Plan.18 Both of these 
Plans are designed to ensure that AEMEAD, on behalf 
of the P.R. government, effectively responds to disaster. 
During the first few days of the catastrophe the island 
was in chaos. The ex-director of AEMEAD under Gov. 
Fortuño, Epifanio Jimenez, claimed that the chaos was 
due to lack of familiarity of AEMEAD’s leadership and 
other agencies with the emergency plans. According 
to him, not even the Crisis Management Plan or the 
Distribution Plan were followed to properly distribute 
and handle food and donations. Also, he claimed that 
most of AEMEAD’s response to the catastrophe was 
improvised.19 
As AEMEAD failed to respond to the catastrophe, 
FEMA had to take the primary role in the emergency 
management process during Hurricane Maria. Simply 
put, the P.R. government was not prepared and did not 
follow its emergency plan. In a statement, Brock Long, 
FEMA administrator, expressed to Congress that the 
P.R. government “trusted [FEMA] to be not only the 
primary response, but basically the only answer for many 
weeks.” 20 He continued by adding that "FEMA has never 
been designed to be the first response and should not be." 
The P.R. government’s emergency protocol, however, was 
unable to comply with its primary responsibilities during 
an emergency situation, proving itself unresponsive.
Recovery
The recovery period for Hurricane Maria in Puerto 
Rico was uncertain. On October 14, 2017 (24 days 
after landfall), Gov. Rosselló announced that the P.R. 
government would ensure a 95% power restoration by 
December 15, 2017.21 Due to the magnitude of the 
devastation, the P.R. government was not able to fulfill 
its promise of achieving a 95% power restoration, only 
achieving a 63% by December 14, 2017.22  P.R. officials 
blamed their unsuccessful attempt on the lack of 
materials and the severity of the destruction. By March 
16, 2017, Justo Gonzalez, acting director of PREPA, 
announced that PREPA had achieved 93% of power 
restoration.21  The recovery process led by the P.R. 
government resulted in an even longer recovery period 
than originally expected.
The severity of the financial situation on the island 
represented an even greater challenge for the recovery 
process. After the devastation, the need to rebuild the 
power grid of the island became the main financial 
burden for the P.R. government. Based on estimates 
given by Gov. Rosselló, the first 2 months of work 
for restoring power in Puerto Rico would cost an 
approximate of $1,680 million.24 The P.R. government 
relied on the federal government’s financial support for 
these expenses, but much of the delay in the recovery 
of the island and the restoration of power was due to 
the inability of the P.R. government to disburse funding 
for these efforts. The P.R. government was forced to rely 
on the financial support of the federal government to 
continue recovery operations in the island.
11.1: 1-7
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
*As of February 16, 2018 (website keeps being updated with 
new approved applications)
Table 1. Summary of Findings
Figure 1. FEMA Total Dollars
Figure 1 illustrates that as of February 16, 2018 FEMA 
had approved a total of $4,769 million in funding for 
hurricanes Harvey, Irma in Puerto Rico, Irma in Florida, 
and Maria. This total amount includes funding approved 
through the Individual & Households Program (IHP) 
and Public Assistance (PA) Grants. Hurricane Harvey 
had the highest funding allocation of $2,180 million, 
followed by Hurricane Maria which had an allocation of 
$1,578 million.
Figure 2. Distribution of PA Grants
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the total 
amount of Public Assistance (PA) Grants allocated 
as of February 16, 2018 by hurricane. The distribution 
is represented in percentages (%). The total amount 
allocated in PA Grants was $1,201 million. 
Hurricane Harvey received the highest allocation 
of PA Grants accounting for 52% (or $625 million) 
of the total amount, followed by Hurricane Maria 
which received 46% (or $555 million).
Figure 3. IHP Dollars vs. Applications Approved
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution between total 
Individual & Households Program (IHP) dollars 
assigned and the total number of applications 
approved as of February 16, 2018. A total of $3,568 
million was approved in IHP dollars. Hurricane 
Harvey received the highest allocation $1,555 million 
of IHP dollars, followed by Hurricane Maria with an 
allocation of $1,023 million, and a total of about 1.6 
million applications were approved. Hurricane Irma in 
11.1: 1-7
5
Rivera: Emergency Management for Hurricane Maria
Published by STARS, 2020
6www.URJ.ucf.edu
THE PEGASUS REVIEW:
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL
Florida had the highest application approval of 71, 000, 
followed by Hurricane Maria with a total of 438,000.
Phases of Emergency Management
Mitigation
The federal government did not enforce sections of 
the Stafford Act requiring states, territories, and tribal 
government who receive federal funding for mitigation 
measures to invest it accordingly.29 Sec. 203(g)(2) of 
the Stafford Act states that the President shall consider, 
when awarding financial assistance for mitigation, "the 
degree of commitment by the State or local government 
to reduce damages from future natural disasters.” In the 
2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report (AAR), 
FEMA “encourage[s] critical infrastructure owners and 
operators, and state and local governments, to invest in 
more resilient infrastructure.”30 There had been limited 
federal oversight on how funds were being allocated and 
how effective the investments of past mitigation efforts 
in Puerto Rico were.
The territorial status of Puerto Rico made FEMA more 
lenient in its planning strategies to address a disaster on 
the island. In the AAR, FEMA recognized that “the 
planning assumptions for a hurricane, earthquake, or 
tsunami striking Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
under-estimated the actual requirements in 2017.”  The 
report shows that FEMA’s earliest emergency plan for 
Puerto Rico was drafted in 2012, while those for the 
states of Florida and Texas was drafted in 2016 and 2013 
respectively. Perhaps the distance of Puerto Rico from 
the mainland U.S. gave FEMA a lesser sense of priority 
with the island territory.
Preparedness
FEMA was not fully prepared to address a catastrophe in 
Puerto Rico for the 2017 hurricane season. In the AAR, 
FEMA recognized that their “planners increasingly 
employ the practice of pre-disaster resource phasing 
planning,” but Puerto Rico “did not [have] an existing 
Resource Phasing Plan (RPP) during the response” of 
Hurricane Maria. Their planners had to improvise using 
lessons learned from past RPP efforts to ensure the 
flow of resources to the island. The impact of Hurricane 
Harvey and Irma did affect the ability of FEMA to be 
properly prepared for Hurricane Maria. FEMA faced 
staffing challenges, forcing the agency to “implement 
innovative methods to augment the disaster workforce.” 
11.1: 1-7
FEMA had to divide its support efforts between Texas, 
Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, given 
the record demand for FEMA assistance.
FEMA had a lesser sense of priority addressing the 
resource short-fall on the island after Hurricane Irma. 
Puerto Rico almost depleted the resources FEMA had 
available on the island. The island territory had to face 
Hurricane Maria with a shortage of resources. The AAR 
states that the “distribution activities following Hurricane 
Irma created an immediate deficit of commodities” at 
the Caribbean Distribution Center warehouse in Puerto 
Rico, “requiring additional items to be transported in 
the days immediately prior to and following Hurricane 
Maria’s landfall.” FEMA was faced with historically 
unprecedented preparedness needs and therefore did 
not have all resources available to effectively respond the 
disasters.
Response
As AEMEAD failed to respond to the catastrophe, 
FEMA had to step in and take the leading role in the 
emergency management process. The P.R. government 
collapsed due to a lack of communications and power, 
forcing the federal government to take the leading role 
in the emergency response.  In the AAR’s key findings, 
“FEMA provided logistical coordination to move and 
distribute commodities from staging areas to survivors in 
Puerto Rico, supplementing a role that should largely be 
managed and coordinated at the state or territory level.” 
FEMA had to overcome its preparedness challenges 
while dealing with very limited emergency response 
support from the P.R. government.
Geographic challenges and lack of preparedness of the 
P.R. government represented a struggle for FEMA to 
respond effectively. FEMA had to take a more active role 
in the emergency response situation during Hurricane 
Maria than historically expected. FEMA had to assume 
“a more active role in coordinating whole community 
logistics operations for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands due to these territories' preparedness challenges, 
geographic distance, and pre-existing, on-the-ground 
conditions.”  The severity of the impact of Hurricane 
Maria in Puerto Rico forced FEMA to scale its 
emergency operations to one of the biggest in its history.
Recovery
Previous disasters in other states and territories diverted 
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FEMA’s limited resources from Puerto Rico’s disaster 
relief.  Due to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and 
the California wildfires, FEMA had to deal with 
“unprecedented resource needs of consecutive response 
operations.”32 According to the AAR, the problem 
was that “FEMA not only exhausted commodities on 
hand but also exhausted pre-negotiated contracts to 
provide meals, tarps, water, and other resources during 
the responses to hurricanes Harvey and Irma.”  When 
FEMA had to deal with the emergency in Puerto Rico 
after Hurricane Maria, it had already depleted most of 
its resources.
Worse yet, the allocation of federal funding for disaster 
relief was unequally distributed among affected states 
and territories. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria 
caused a combined $265 billion in damage and resulted 
in widespread displacement of survivors. Yet Congress 
and other federal agencies have been dubious about 
the island's requests of relief funding “due to poor 
pre-disaster infrastructure conditions.”33 In the AAR, 
FEMA claims it has been challenging to “determine 
whether some or all of post-hurricane recorded damages 
were attributable to the disasters.” Because of PREPA’s 
already weak power grid, “FEMA could not make 
necessary repairs to damaged system components that 
remained connected or serviced by undamaged, outdated 
elements.” The main struggle of Puerto Rico’s recovery 
is finding the appropriate funding to overcome the $90 
billion in damage caused by Hurricane Maria. 
CONCLUSION
Hurricane Maria was the worst natural disaster to 
impact Puerto Rico in its modern history. It caused an 
approximate of $90 billion in damages and an estimated 
of 2,975 deaths during the following six months 
after its impact.34 Participating agencies did not take 
necessary procedures to effectively deal with the phases 
of emergency management before, during, and after the 
catastrophe. The evidence suggests that AEMEAD and 
FEMA fell short on their preparedness and response 
to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. The magnitude 
of the storm, previous financial struggles, and lack of 
preparedness were the main factors that influenced 
the emergency management process for AEMEAD. 
Also, ongoing disasters, lack of priority, and geographic 
challenges were the main factors that adversely affected 
FEMA’s emergency management process. The collapse 
of the entire commutation system and power grid in 
the island were the main elements that significantly 
complicated local and federal emergency management 
scenario.
FEMA utilized outdated emergency planning procedures 
for Puerto Rico that dated to 2012. There is a need for 
FEMA to take responsibility and update its emergency 
plans to respond to a hurricane crisis for the island. Also, 
there is a need for FEMA to have an appropriate system 
for data collection and trained staff in the island. FEMA 
should recognize that Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands are extremely vulnerable. Therefore, it must have 
supplemental commodities and resources available in its 
Caribbean Distribution Center. Additionally, it should 
properly train local officials in Puerto Rico about FEMA 
resources, such as grant opportunities available and how 
to solicit them. The gap between AEMEAD and FEMA 
should be bridged through greater and more constant 
interaction between the two agencies.
AEMEAD’s lack of response to the catastrophe 
adversely affected the lives and wellbeing of its citizens. 
After the hurricane’s landfall, AEMEAD was unable to 
assess the catastrophe or communicate with help outside 
of the island. Also, it did not have enough resources 
as to mitigate the hurricane’s impact. The island 
descended into chaos while AEMEAD failed to reach 
most municipalities and was incapable of transporting 
commodities. AEMEAD must adopt an implementable 
emergency plan that accounts and corrects for its failures 
during Hurricane Maria. It should routinely simulate 
and test the effectiveness and employability of its plan. 
The island’s emergency management officials should also 
be properly trained to understand the emergency plan 
and what to do in case of an emergency.
Puerto Rico is facing the biggest social and economic 
crisis in its modern history. Because of the crisis caused 
by Maria, an estimated amount of 136,000 Puerto Ricans 
left the island and moved to the mainland U.S.35 This 
exodus raises serious concerns, especially for the P.R. 
government, since its population continues shrinking, 
further complicating the fiscal and economic conditions 
of the island. Puerto Rico is suffering a catastrophic 
combination of “a vicious cycle of austerity, recession 
and a shrinking population, now compounded by a 
natural disaster, creating even greater challenges for its 
recovery.”36
It is essential that FEMA and AEMEAD make 
themselves accountable for the emergency management 
process in Puerto Rico. Also, it is important for them 
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to accept responsibility for their short comings. 
Corrective actions are necessary to address these issues. 
Proper actions such as effective planning, routine 
training, and responsible mitigation measures should 
be implemented to responsibly correct for previous 
emergency management failures. These three elements—
accountability, responsibility, and corrective actions—are 
essential for each agency to recognize what needs to be 
addressed to avoid any similar catastrophes in the future. 
The environmental threats are real and they keep getting 
worse. Therefore, it is necessary to be prepared as a nation 
and become more resilient to mitigate future natural 
disasters and avoid further tragedies.
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